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REDUCING GREENHOUSE GASES: A COMBINED STRATEGY
USING FEES, PERMITS, AND COUNTRY COMMITMENTS*
DONALD M. GOLDBERG**
INTRODUCTION
In June 1992, over 150 nations signed the United Nation's Framework
Convention on Climate Change (Climate Convention).' The Convention's
objective, to stabilize concentrations of greenhouse gases "at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system," will
require many countries to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs)
far below present levels As negotiators and commentators have considered
mechanisms for implementing the Climate Convention, three basic regimes for
limiting GHG emissions have come under scrutiny: (1) country commitments;4
(2) international emissions fees;' and (3) international marketable permits.'
Each regime has strengths and weaknesses which must be evaluated and
combined into a strategy implementing the strengths and mitigating or avoiding
the weaknesses of each.
The principle source of anthropogenic (human-induced) GHG emissions is
the burning of fossil fuels for energy and transportation in industrial countries
* This paper is intended to spark discussions about the combined strategy. All comments and
refinements are welcome.
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1. UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, JuNE 12,1992, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 38, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [hereinafter CLIMATE CONVENTION].
2. Id. art. 2.
3. It has been estimated that to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of C0 2, the most
important GHG, at current levels would require a 60-80% reduction from current emission levels.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC SCIENTIFIC
ASSESSMENT 18 (1990) [hereinafter IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT].
4. The term "country commitments" is used in this article to refer to a combination of
technology-based standards and "targets and timetables." See infra notes 15-17 and accompany-
ing text.
5. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC
RESPONSE STRATEGIES 240-41 (1991) [hereinafter IPCC RESPONSE STRATEGIES].
6. Id.
7. WORLD RESOURCES INSTrrUTE, WORLD RESOuRcEs 1992-93, at 346-49 (1992)
[hereinafter WRI 92-93]. As used in this paper the term "industrial countries" includes the so-
called "transitional economy" countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union.
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Although industrial countries have only about one-fourth of the world's
population,8 they account for nearly seventy-five percent of the world's
consumption of fossil fuels9 and more than two-thirds of industrial and energy-
based emissions of carbon dioxide (CO 2),"° the principle GHG." Therefore,
solving the problem of global warming through reduced GHG production
means, first and foremost, reducing fossil fuel use in industrial countries.
Two additional problems face any effort to reduce GHG production world-
wide. First, the international community must equitably address the growing
demand for energy in developing countries. If no constraints are imposed,
energy use in developing countries will continue to increase and may eventually
surpass energy use in industrial countries.' Second, the international
community must decrease the rate of deforestation. Arresting the rapid rate
of deforestation13 is necessary not only for climate protection, but also for
species protection, soil conservation, and other important environmental issues.
Every year huge tracts of forest are cut or burned, releasing vast quantities of
CO2 into the atmosphere. 4
This article proposes a strategy for reducing GHG emissions in industrial
countries, limiting the growth of emissions in developing countries, and reducing
or eliminating deforestation. By combining the most useful elements of country
commitments, international emissions fees, and international marketable
permits, these three goals may be achieved. Part I of this article describes the
three basic regimes and the central problems any successful regime must
address. The proposed strategy, entitled "combined strategy," is described in
Part II. It consists of two components: an emissions control mechanism and
a financial mechanism. Part III evaluates this strategy in terms of specific
criteria: costs, effectiveness, fairness, political acceptability, innovation and
diffusion of technology, and administration and monitoring. Finally, Part IV
explores, by way of example, how the strategy would work given some specific
goals and assumptions.
I. THE THREE BASIC REGIMES
A. Country Commitments
The first regime, country commitments, would require that parties to the
Climate Convention reduce emissions of GHGs by meeting performance-based
8. David Pearce, Population Growth in BLuEPRINT 2: GREENING THE WORLD ECONOMY
109, 110 (David Pearce ed., 1991).
9. WRI 92-93, supra note 7, at 315-317.
10. Id. at 346-47.
11. IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 7.
12. See IPCC RESPONSE STRATEGIES, supra note 5, at 35.
13. Ed Barbier, Tropical Deforestation, in BLUEPRINT 2: GREENING OF THE WORLD
ECONOMY, supra note 8, at 138, 140-41.
14. IPCC RESPONSE STRATEGIES, supra note 5, at 87.
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standards, often referred to as "targets and timetables,"15 or technology-based
standards, such as "best available control technology."' 6 To the extent that
they specify each country's emission reduction goals or strategy for reducing
emissions, country commitments are similar to U.S. command-and-control
environmental regulations. Command-and-control regulations, however, are
slowly giving way to less costly, more flexible, market-based approaches, like
emissions fees and marketable permits.'7
B. Emissions Fees
Under the second regime, emissions fees would be charged to governments
according to the amount of GHGs their country emits.'" Alternatively, they
could be levied directly on polluters or producers of GHGs. As fees increase,
emissions become more costly and the incentive to reduce becomes greater.
C. Marketable Permits
The third regime proposes that international marketable permits be
allocated to countries or individual polluters to allow emissions of specified
amounts of GHGs." A global emissions cap would be set by the number of
permits allocated. Polluters would have the option of selling or trading their
permits to other polluters with higher marginal abatement costs. Over time, the
number of permits in circulation would be reduced by agreement until the
target level of global emissions is reached.
15. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer relied on targets and
timetables to control emissions of chloroflorocarbons (CFCs). Industrial country parties initially
committed to reduce consumption of CFCs by 50% by the year 2000. Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Final Act, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541, 1552 (1987).
Subsequently, these targets and timetables were strengthened to require a complete phaseout by
1996. Report of the 4th Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, Nov. 25, 1992, U.N.
Doc. UNEP/OzLPro.4/15, annex 1 (1992).
16. In the U.S., "best available control technology" refers to strict emissions standards
requiring sources to install control technology so as to achieve "the maximum degree of reduction
possible." Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (1990).
17. TOM TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 419 (2d ed.
1988). Country commitments would not prevent individual countries from adopting a national
system of marketable permits or emission fees. Such an approach would have many of the
advantages of the international scheme but would not be as cost-effective in the long run. This
national approach will not be considered in this article.
18. IPCC RESPONSE STRATEGIES, supra note 5, at 240-41.
19. 1& at 240-41.
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II. THE PROPOSAL: A COMBINED STRATEGY
A. Framework
The framework of the combined strategy has two primary components:
(1) An emissions control mechanism that would include:
(a) an international marketable permit systemfor controlling emissions,
with permits allocated initially on the basis of past emissions but
converging exponentially to an equal per capita distribution at a reduced
global level ° and
(b) country commitments to (i) use "best available control technology"
to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases from sources not amenable to
control by market mechanisms, and (ii) adopt targets and timetables to
phase out deforestation.
(2) A financial mechanism that would establish:
(a) an abatement fund financed from unallocated emission permits to
provide financial and technical assistance to countries seeking to reduce
their emissions; and
(b) a damage fund financed from sliding-scale emissions fees to cover
the "external" costs of GHG emissions, including: costs of avoiding,
repairing and mitigating damage resulting from global warming;
insurance costs for highly vulnerable states; and costs of administering
the climate agreement
B. The Emissions Control Mechanism
1. International Marketable Permits"
The central feature of the proposed emissions control mechanism is a
system of international marketable permits. To implement such a system, a
global emissions target, a date for meeting that target, and a global emissions
reduction schedule must be selected.' In addition, the amounts and periods
of permit allocations must be specified. In the proposed strategy, one year's
worth of permits would be allocated each year. In the first year, countries
would receive permits equal to their historical level of annual emissions. In the
second year, and each year thereafter, the allocation would be adjusted
downward to meet a target of reduced global emissions, eventually to converge
in the target year at a common per capita level. Countries with per capita
emissions currently above the target level would have their per capita allocation
20. See JOSHUA M. EPSTEIN & RAJ GUPTA, CONTROLLING THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT: FIVE
GLOBAL REGIONS COMPARED 8-15 (1990).
21. See IPCC RESPONSE STRATEGIES, supra note 5, at 240-41.
22. For example, linear reductions or exponential reductions could be chosen.
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reduced. Countries with per capita emissions below the target level would have
their allocation increased.
2. Country Commitments
Countries will have to commit to take specific action limiting emissions of
GHGs from sources that presently cannot be regulated by market mechanisms.
In order to impose emissions fees on a source, emissions must be quantifiable.
Permit trading requires not only that emissions be quantifiable but also that
they can be maintained at or below a specified level. Not all sources meet
these criteria. For example, methane emissions from livestock and rice paddies
and nitrous oxide emissions from denitrification of fertilizers can be neither
easily counted nor controlled.24 Until such emissions become quantifiable,
country commitments to use best available control technology should be the
most workable approach to restricting emissions from these sources.
Country commitments to eliminate deforestation will also be needed.
Permits can provide an incentive to phase out deforestation ahead of schedule
and to help compensate countries for costs incurred in reducing or eliminating
deforestation. Because permits alone cannot guarantee that deforestation will
be eliminated, or even reduced, countries should also commit to targets and
timetables to phase out deforestation.
C. The Financial Mechanism
1. Abatement Fund
Developing countries will need technical and financial assistance to fulfill
their commitments to control emissions.25 A marketable permit system would
allow countries with low per capita emissions to sell or trade excess permits for
technology or other forms of assistance. There is no guarantee, however, that
developing countries would use the proceeds of their permit sales to address
global warming. Unless the same limitation were imposed on the more
industrialized countries, however, it would be unfair to require developing
countries to invest in new technologies or other GHG abatement programs.
Therefore, some unallocated permits should be held in an internationally
administered abatement fund to finance technology transfers and other costs of
controlling emissions. The fund would provide grants and concessional loans,
with the level of assistance based on the recipient country's ability to pay.
Ability to pay could be based on per capita income.
23. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
24. IPCC RESPONSE STRATEGIES, supra note 5, at 110-11; IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT,
supra note 3, at 29; U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECrION AGENCY, POLICY OPTIONS FOR
STABILIZING GLOBAL CLIMATE 11-14 (1990).
25. William R. Cline, Global Warming: The Economic Stakes, POL'Y ANALYSES INT'L ECON,
May 1992, at 1, 83 (estimating that resource flows to developing countries for control of GHGs
will require on the order of $5 billion to $10 billion annually).
1993]
42 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM
2. Damage Fund
In accordance with the "polluter pays principle,"26 the costs of repairing,
adapting to, or avoiding damage from global warming-other than by abating
emissions-should be borne by polluters in proportion to their contribution to
global warming. It would be inconsistent with the polluter pays principle to pay
these remediation and adaptation costs out of the abatement fund, because this
would require all countries to pay irrespective of their contribution to total
GHG emissions. Therefore, a second fund would be needed to cover the
external costs of GHG emissions, including the costs of mitigating or adapting
to damage, insuring vulnerable states, and administering the climate agreement.
In keeping with the polluter pays principle, the fund would be financed from
sliding-scale emissions fees. As a country's emissions rise, the fee on each
additional unit of pollution would increase as well. Because marginal damage
costs are expected to increase as the buildup of GHGs increases,2 7 the
proportion of total damage caused by countries with high per capita emissions
is greater than their proportion of global GHG emissions. Thus, as countries'
per capita emissions increase, their "marginal tax rate" should increase.
III. EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED COMBINED STRATEGY
This section discusses the combined strategy in terms of costs, effectiveness,
fairness, political acceptability, innovation and diffusion of technology, and
administration and monitoring.
A. Costs
Market mechanisms, such as emissions fees or marketable permits, can
achieve a given level of pollution reduction at a lower cost than direct
command-and-control regulation. They accomplish this by allocating abatement
obligations to those who can achieve them at the lowest cost.2" With market-
based schemes, polluters are given the choice of abating their emissions or
incurring the cost of a fee or permit to continue emitting. Presumably they will
choose whichever is cheaper. The market creates conditions which equalize
26. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL,
RECOMMENDATION ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLLUTER-PAYS PRINCIPLE, Nov. 14,
1974, OECD Doc. C(74)223, 14 I.L.M. 234 (1974).
27. This is clear if one considers the likely consequences of extreme warming; for example,
melting of polar ice caps could result in a sea level rise of 6 to 7 meters. Gjerrit P. Hekstra, Sea
Level Rise: Regional Consequences and Responses, in GREENHOUSE WARMING: ABATEMENT
AND ADAPTATION, 53, 55 (1989).
28. See generally Daniel J. Dudek & John Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why Is This
Thoroughbred Hobbled?, 13 COL. J. ENvTL. L. 217 (1988); Robert W. Hahn, Economic
Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: How the Patient Followed the Doctor's Orders, J.
ECON. PERSP., Spring 1989, at 95, 98 (marketable permits and emissions charges induce businesses
to search for lower cost methods of achieving environmental standards); Tom H. Tietenberg,
Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation, 6 OxFORD REv. ECON. POL'Y 17 (1990).
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marginal abatement costs for all polluters. Those with lower abatement costs
will eliminate their emissions while those with higher abatement costs will
purchase permits or pay the fees necessary to continue to pollute.29 Individual
countries, particularly the United States, have implemented national marketable
permit schemes to control pollution at reduced costs.3" However, because
some countries are able to reduce emissions less expensively than others, even
greater savings could be achieved if the market were to operate internationally.
The market approach, however, may not work as well in practice as in
theory. Polluters may lack information about abatement technologies, face
significant transaction costs, not have ready access to permit markets, or fail to
respond to market incentives. Nevertheless, experience with market mecha-
nisms indicates that real world savings can be achieved."1
B. Effectiveness
While both emissions fees and marketable permits would promote cost-
effective reductions in GHGs, they may not be equally effective in preventing
damage to the atmosphere caused by GHG emissions. With marketable
permits, as with country commitments, regulators specify the level of emissions
(for example, seven billion tons of carbon in 2000) and must predict the
marginal costs of implementation. With emissions fees, regulators specify the
marginal cost of abatement (for example $50 per ton of carbon), but can only
guess at the resulting level of emissions reduction. Given that the primary goal
of regulating greenhouse gases is to protect humans from potentially serious
environmental damage, the more prudent approach would be to use marketable
permits set at levels considered safe according to the best available scientific
understanding.3 2
29. For example, in a world consisting of two polluters, where one can reduce emissions by
one unit at a cost of $1000 and another can reduce emissions by one unit for $500, requiring both
polluters to reduce by one unit would cost $1500. However, if pollution allowances are traded,
the polluter with the higher cost would be willing to pay its lower-cost counterpart $500 to reduce
by two units. The total cost, then, for the same two units of abatement is only $1000. In this way
the market achieves a cost-effective distribution, i.e., one in which marginal costs of pollution
reduction are the same for all polluters. See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E.
OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (2d ed. 1988) (discussing cost-effective
approaches to environmental regulation).
30. Anil Markandya, Global Warming: The Economics of Tradeable Permits, in BLUEPRINT
2: GREENING THE WORLD ECONOMY, supra note 8, at 53, 60.
31. See e.g., HAHN, supra note 28, at 100 (estimating aggregate lifetime savings of $25 million
to $300 million in permitting costs and $500 million to $12 billion in emission control costs for
various emissions trading programs under the Clean Air Act).
32. A particular concern is that there may be threshold effects from global warming, i.e., that
severe damage could result once certain levels of greenhouse gas concentrations are reached. See,
e.g., Wallace S. Broecker & George H. Denton, What Drives Glacial Cycles?, SCI. AM., Jan. 1990,
at 49, 56.
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Furthermore, the permit approach is similar to the decisionmaking
regulators engage in under traditional performance-based command-and-control
regimes. Like command-and-control regulations, marketable permit regimes
begin with the setting of a desired emissions level. Permits merely provide a
mechanism to implement selected levels of protection in a more cost effective
manner.3 Regulators may select the same level of protection under permits
as they would under a command-and-control regime, or, knowing that permits
will make implementation less expensive for polluters, they may choose a more
stringent level."
C. Fairness
Any solution to global warming must reconcile the differences between
industrial and developing countries' interests in allocating the earth's capacity
to assimilate GHGs. Industrial countries may feel that because they have built
up their economies in reliance on a certain level of emissions, they are entitled
to continue to use their historical proportion of the atmosphere. On the other
hand, developing countries might argue that industrial countries have already
used their share and what remains belongs principally to the developing
countries?5 The strategy offered here is a compromise. Marketable permits
would be allocated initially on the basis of historical emissions levels, but would
converge to a common per capita allocation at a greatly reduced level. The
approach would respond to each country's concerns regarding fairness, while
providing protection against global warming.
Because of the rapid rate of growth in their GHG emissions, it is crucial that
developing countries participate in an emissions abatement regime. Developing
countries, however, are not likely to use their own scarce resources to control
their emissions. They argue that the industrial world achieved its high standard
of living largely by disregarding such environmental hazards, and further note
that their per capita emissions are only a small fraction of industrial country per
capita emissions, which they view largely as "luxury emissions."36 If develop-
ing countries receive permits in excess of their actual emissions, as this strategy
33. To convert from technology-based command-and-control regulations to performance-based
marketable permits, regulators would have to calculate the emissions levels resulting from the
existing technology standards, substitute an equivalent performance standard, and issue permits
for the amount of allowed pollution.
34. In fact, this is the approach taken in the CFC trading provisions in the Clean Air Act,
which requires that trades result in lower emissions than would occur otherwise. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7671f(a) (1992). See also Joseph J. DiMona, The Role of Emissions Allowance Trading in the
Reduction of Greenhouse Gases (1991) (Working Paper on Technology and Global Change, No.
4, on file at Center for International Environmental Law, Washington D.C.).
35. See ANIL AGARWAL & SuNrrA NARAIN, GLOBAL WARMING IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD
2 (1991).
36. Id. at 5; David Batker, The Rift Between North and South Over Development and
Finances, AMERICA, May 23, 1992, at 458, 458.
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contemplates, they could exchange the excess permits for state-of-the-art, highly
efficient technology, which would improve their competitiveness and reduce
their emissions.
Countries must also decide how to distribute the many other costs of
responding to global warming. Countries whose per capita emissions do not
exceed the earth's absorptive capacity should not be required to pay for
adaptation, mitigation and other external costs. Moreover, marginal damage
increases as the atmospheric concentration of GHGs increases. Thus, the
damage caused by large polluters is disproportionately greater than the damage
caused by small polluters. A properly structured emissions fee should address
these issues by taxing only per capita emissions which exceed the level of per
capita emissions that the earth can absorb and by increasing as per capita
emissions increase.
D. Political Acceptability
Industrial countries will prefer strategies that minimize disruption to their
economies. A permit scheme that gradually shifts from an allocation based on
historical levels of emissions to common per capita emissions would provide
time to adjust their economies, develop new technologies, and implement
strategies for reducing emissions.
A permit allocation converging at a common per capita level would appeal
to developing countries because they would receive a net resource transfer.
Industrial countries would prefer to avoid such a transfer, but recognize that a
global warming agreement will not be effective unless it addresses the projected
rapid growth in developing country emissions. They know that developing
countries will not substantially reduce their rate of emissions growth without
assistance and accept that some form of resource transfer will be needed.37 To
the extent that there is a correlation between damage from global warming and
gross domestic product, industrial countries also have more to gain from
abatement than developing countries.
E. Innovation and Diffusion of Technology
By providing a continuing incentive to reduce emissions, both emissions
fees and marketable permits would stimulate the development of innovative
technologies. Permits would also promote the diffusion of such technologies by
encouraging firms in industrial countries to transfer abatement technologies to
firms in developing countries in exchange for permits. In particular, such firm
to firm trading could promote the transfer of vital "soft" technology, such as
technical training.
37. Indeed, the inclusion of a financial mechanism "for the provision of financial resources
on a grant or concessional basis, including the transfer of technology" in the Climate Convention
shifts the question from whether to have a resource transfer to how large should the transfer be;
see CLIMATE CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 11.
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Developing countries are particularly concerned that they may not have
access to, or be able to afford, state-of-the-art technologies protected by
intellectual property rights. As a result, they have insisted that industrial
countries ensure that technology be transferred on a preferential or non-
commercial basis. 38 Industrial countries have, thus far, resisted these demands,
arguing that in free market countries the government does not own the
technology and therefore cannot agree to transfer it.39 As a possible solution
to this problem, the role of the abatement fund could be expanded to allow it
to purchase technology, in particular patents and licenses, to be transferred to
developing countries on favorable terms. Because the abatement fund would
be financed with permits, which are sensitive to the rise and fall of abatement
costs, the assets available to the fund for technology purchase would also rise
and fall with the price of technology. If high technology costs raise the cost of
abatement, permit prices will go up and the fund's assets will increase.
Similarly, low technology costs will reduce not only the fund's assets, but also
the need for those assets. Using the abatement fund to invest in abatement
technology could also lower the price of permits, perhaps substantially, both by
stimulating research and development and by subsidizing the cost to polluters
of abatement.40
The abatement fund could also serve as a clearinghouse to collect and
disseminate technical information, identify and promote projects, conduct pre-
investment studies, oversee project construction, provide training, and monitor
operations. It could administer and facilitate permit trading, link buyers and
sellers, evaluate trades, and verify reductions.
F. Administration and Monitoring
Ease of administration is one reason to prefer emissions fees over
marketable permits. Emissions fees are easy to administer because they can be
levied at the source. For example, fossil fuel producers could be charged a
carbon tax, which they would pass on to polluters. In contrast, because of the
direct link between abatement costs and permit prices, permits would have to
be held and traded by polluters. Since there are many more polluters than
producers, administration would be correspondingly more difficult.
The problem presented when producers hold permits is that the efficiency
of permit trading derives from the direct link between permit prices and
abatement costs. Polluters know the cost of reducing emissions and, therefore,
know what a permit is worth. Producers have no similar mechanism to inform
38. IPCC RESPONSE STRATEGIES, supra note 5, at 226.
39. Id.; see also UNITED NATIONS, DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, EARTH SUMMIT IN
Focus No. 3, U.N. Doc. DPI/1161 (Sept. 1991).
40. Studies have shown that direct investment of the proceeds from a carbon tax in abatement
could lower the level of tax required by an order of magnitude. FLORENTIN KRAUSE ELT AL.,
ENERGY POLICY IN THE GREENHOUSE, vol. 2, Draft Final Report, at 11.3.11 (1992) (on file with
author).
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them of the correct "market clearing" price for permits. The problem of
monitoring is not insurmountable, however. Emissions in a permit system could
be monitored at the stack or at the pump, since the amount of fuel consumed
determines the amount of GHGs emitted.
Another problem associated with international permit trading is that, while
emissions fees or country commitments require only national monitoring,
international trades would require cross-border verification. This difficulty gives
rise to the danger that emission reductions in countries with effective monitor-
ing mechanisms will be offset by increases in countries lacking such mecha-
nisms. Thus, there should be a mechanism, preferably at the international level,
for evaluating international trades. As noted above, this may be a role for the
abatement fund. Permit trades that cannot be adequately monitored should not
be approved. The burden should be on the trading parties to demonstrate, and
if necessary provide the means for, effective monitoring.
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE COMBINED STRATEGY
The following section illustrates how the combined strategy would work
given certain specific assumptions. For simplicity, the emissions scheme
discussed here will be for CO2 only. Of all GHGs, CO2 is the easiest to
monitor and control, and accounts for more than half of human-induced global
warming.41
A. The Global Emissions Cap
For the purposes of the proposed strategy, assume negotiators decide to
reduce 1995 global carbon emissions levels by forty-five percent by the year
2025. Assuming a 1995 carbon emissions baseline of 7.7 billion tons (gigatons
or Gt), z the target of a forty-five percent reduction by 2025 could be achieved
by reducing global emissions, or total permit allocations, by 0.12 Gt per year.
B. Permit Allocations
Permits would be allocated annually as follows:
(1) The year 2025 would be the target for permits to be distributed on an
equal per capita basis. A permit allocation in 2025 of 0.5 tons of carbon per
capita per year would result in annual global emissions of 4.2 Gt of carbon,
fifty-five percent of the 1995 baseline amount.
(2) Beginning in 1995, and each year thereafter, a year's worth of
emissions permits would be allocated to all countries based on their previous
year's energy-related emissions, adjusted by an annual percentage increase or
decrease, so that by the year 2025 an allocation of 0.5 tons of carbon per capita
41. IPCC SCIENFIC ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 7.
42. WRI 92-93, supra note 7, at 346-49 (based on 1995 population projections).
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would be achieved in all countries. To avoid giving countries an incentive to
increase their populations in order to receive more permits, each country's 2025
population would be estimated in advance.43
The percentage annual adjustments to permit allocations that would be
required of several countries are given in Table 1. While the industrial
countries' rate of decrease may seem high, their rate of actual abatement would
probably be much lower because they could purchase additional permits from
developing countries.
Table 1"
Country
Annual
Abatement
C. The Financial Mechanism
1. Abatement Fund
Because the allocation scheme suggested above reduces global emissions
in a straight line while adjusting permit allocations exponentially (more akin to
natural growth or decline), it creates a pool of unallocated permits during the
43. Some commentators have suggested basing allocations on current population levels. See
Anil Markandya, Global Warming: The Economics of Tradeable Permits, in BLUEPRINr 2:
GREENING THE WORLD ECONOMY, supra note 8, at 52, 59; MICHAEL GRUBB, THE GREEN-
HOUSE EFFECT: NEGOTIATING TARGETS 37 (1989); AGARWAL & NARAIN, supra note 35, at 20.
Since developing country populations are certain to grow, a common per capita emissions target
should reflect estimated growth without rewarding countries for exceeding estimates or penalizing
them for falling short.
44. This table and those that follow are based on data from WRI 92-93, supra note 7, at 246-
47, 346-47. The percent annual adjustment (R) is given by the formula R=
ln((.5/EJ(PwiP,,s))/30; where E, is per capita emissions and P is population.
U.S. -7.4%
Germany -6.1%
Poland -5.7%
U.K. -5.5%
Japan -5.1%
Mexico -0.9%
China 02%
Brazil 13%
India 4.3%
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period prior to 2025 when emissions converge at a common per capita level.
This is illustrated in Figure 1. The creation of unallocated permits will reach
a peak between the years 2005 and 2015, when such permits will be most
needed for the acquisition of abatement technology by developing countries.
After 2015 the aggregate value of unallocated permits will decrease, until they
cease to be created in 2025. By this time, it is expected that major investments
will have been made in abatement technology, and developing countries will
have sufficient resources, including their own supply of unused permits, to
continue on the path of energy-efficient and sustainable development.
Figure 1
Energy-related Permit Allocation
GtC 10--
8.0-
6.0-
4.0 -
2.0
0--
1995 2005 2015
2. Damage Fund
An annual damage fee would be levied on each country, based on its
contribution to global warming and on actual damage costs for the past year.
Making the annual damage fee proportional to each country's per capita
contribution to GHG increases would be a crude but manageable formula for
2025
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sliding-scale fees. For example, suppose the fee is set at $0.25 per ton of
carbon equivalent emissions per capita. The United States, which each year
adds approximately four tons of GHGs to the atmosphere (in carbon equivalent
terms) per capit. 5 or one billion tons total, would pay 4 x $0.25 x 1 billion =
$1 billion annually. As it becomes possible to determine with more certainty
the relationship between a country's per capita emissions and its contribution
to global warming, more sophisticated foimulas for determining damage fees
can be developed.
D. Deforestation
Emissions trading alone may not provide adequate incentives for sufficient
reduction in the rate of global deforestation. Thus, countries should commit to
phasing out deforestation according to a negotiated schedule. A straight-line
phaseout of deforestation by the year 2025 would reduce carbon emissions
about .057 Gt per year.46
Permits could provide an incentive for countries to phase out deforestation
at an even faster pace. Estimates of the amount of CO2 released through
deforestation range from 80 metric tons to 165 metric tons per hectare and
perhaps higher.47 Assuming that permits trade somewhere between $10 and
$100 per ton, a hectare of closed tropical forest would have a permit value of
$800 to $16,500 or more. To realize this value, countries would be required to
forego deforestation, but they could still benefit from non-emitting uses such
as fruit and latex harvesting, sustainable-yield timber harvesting, or ecotourism.
The economic value of not deforesting would be equal to the area's permit
value plus any additional non-emitting uses. If permits trade at the upper end
of the range, the economic value of a hectare of intact forest may well exceed
the potential return from deforestation.48 In this case, permits alone would
provide sufficient incentive to reduce and even eliminate deforestation. Even
if permits trade at the lower end of the range, their value could still be
sufficient to tip the scale towards sustainable use.49  Furthermore, permits
should be issued to cover only those emissions from deforestation allowed
45. WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, WORLD REsouRcEs 1990-91 at 348 (1990).
46. Assuming the same emission rate from deforestation in 1995 as in 1990 (1.7 Gt), the
annual global deforestation permit allocation (A) is given by A=(1.7/30)(n), where n is the
number of years.
47. IPCC RESPONSE STRATEGIEs, supra note 5, at 98.
48. One study values cattle ranching in Brazilian Amazonia at $2960 per hectare and clear-cut
timber harvesting in Peru at $1001. Charles M. Peters et al., Valuation of an Amazonian
Rainforest, NATURE, June 29, 1989, at 655, 655-56. Another study estimates profits from logging
in the Philippines, which contains some of the world's most valuable timber resources, at about
$4500 per hectare. See Barbier, supra note 13, at 159.
49. Because there are many causes of deforestation, many difficult issues would need to be
resolved. For example, who would hold the permits, the state or private landowners? Who
should receive the proceeds of their sale? What would be done to compensate displaced
squatters who engage in "slash and burn" subsistence agriculture?
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under the country commitment schedule and phased out according to that
schedule, reducing the allocation of deforestation permits each year by .057 Gt.
A summary of the combined strategy is presented in Table 2. The total
number of permits created each year is given in column 2. Columns 3, 4 and
5 show the number of permits allocated to countries. Column 3 shows the
number of emissions permits allocated to industrial countries, while column 4
indicates the developing country allocations. Column 5 shows the number of
permits allocated for deforestation. Columns 3, 4 and 5 are-subtracted from
column 2 to determine the number of unallocated permits available for the
abatement fund, given in column 6. An estimate of the value of these
unallocated permits is given in column 7. In estimating the value, it is assumed
that the price of permits will increase by $3.33 a year to $100 per ton of carbon
in 2025.50
Table 2
Indust. Devel. Defores-
Total Country Country tation Unall.
Year Permits Permits Permits Permits Permits (US$B)
1995 7.7 Gt 4.0 Gt 2.0 Gt 1.7 Gt 0.0 Gt 0.0
2000 7.1 Gt 3.0 Gt 2.2 Gt 1.4 Gt 0.5 Gt 8.3
2005 6.5 Gt 23 Gt 2.4 Gt 1.1 Gt 0.5 Gt 16.7
2010 6.0 Gt 1.7 Gt 2.7 Gt 0.9 Gt 0.7 Gt 35.0
2015 5.4 Gt 13 Gt 2.9 Gt 0.6 Gt 0.6 Gt 40.0
2020 4.8 Gt 1.0 Gt 3.2 Gt 0.3 Gt 0.3 Gt 25.0
2025 4.2 Gt 0.7 Gt 3.5 Gt 0.0 Gt 0.0 Gt 0.0
col. 1 col. 2 col. 3 col. 4 ol. 5 col. 6 col. 7
E. Actual Emissions
To evaluate the proposed emissions permit allocation scheme, it would be
helpful to identify realistic expectations for countries in terms of reducing, or,
in the case of developing countries, limiting the increase of actual emissions.
The studies attempting to estimate these rates differ by orders of magnitude in
their conclusions, making it difficult to predict possible reduction rates. For
industrial country CO2 emissions, a rate of decrease of 2.3% per year is
50. For a summary of studies of the level of emissions fees that would be needed to reduce
emissions, see Peter Hoeller et al., Macroeconomic Implications of Reducing Greenhouse Gas
Emissions: A Survey of Empirical Studies, OECD ECON. STUD., Spring 1991, at 45,46-76.
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consistent with a number of these studies." This would yield a reduction from
1995 levels of twenty percent in 2005 and a fifty percent reduction by 2025.
Table 3 compares the industrial countries' permit allocations, given in column 3,
to their expected emissions, based on an annual rate of decrease of 2.3%, given
in column 2. Column 4 shows the number of permits industrial countries will
need to purchase if they reduce their emissions at this rate. Assuming permits
rise steadily to $100 per ton of carbon by 2025, the cost of the additional
permits that would be required by industrial countries is given in column 5.
Table 3
Industrial
Industrial Country Permit Cost
Year Country CO2  Allocation Deficit (US$B)
1995 4.0 Gt 4.0 Gt 0.0 Gt 0.0
2000 3.6 Gt 3.0 Gt 0.3 Gt 5.0
2005 3.2 Gt 2.3 Gt 0.5 Gt 16.7
2010 2.8 Gt 1.7 Gt 1.1 Gt 55.5
2015 2.5 Gt 1.3 Gt 1.2 Gt 80.0
2020 2.2 Gt 1.0 Gt 1.2 Gt 100.0
2025 2.0 Gt 0.7 Gt 1.3 Gt 130.0
col. 1 col. 2 col. 3 col. 4 ol. 5
For the developing countries, a fifty percent growth in CO2 emissions is
assumed by 2025.2 This is equivalent to a 1.4% annual increase. Table 4
compares developing countries' permit allocations, set out in column 3, to their
expected emissions, shown in column 2. Column 4 shows the number of
51. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CHANGING BY DEGREES 9-10 (1991)
(U.S. emissions could be reduced 29-35% within 25 years at minimal costs; ALLIANCE TO SAVE
ENERGY ET AL., AMERICA'S ENERGY CHOICES: INVESTING IN A STRONG ECONOMY AND A
CLEAN ENVIRONMENT 47 (1991) (U.S. CO2 emissions can be reduced 71% from 1988 levels at
a savings of $2.3 trillion); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF
GREENHOUSE WARMING 73 (1991) (U.S. could reduce or offset its GHG emissions by 10-40%
of 1990 levels at low cost or at some net savings).
52. Though some studies project a greater than 50% increase in developing country CO2
emissions,(see IPCC RESPONSE STRATEGIES, supra note 5, at xxxiii), a 50% increase is assumed
here based on the finding that developing countries can greatly reduce CO2 emissions through
energy efficiency and fuel switching (i.e., from coal to oil, or oil to natural gas) while still
obtaining a lifestyle comparable to Western Europe. JOSE GOLDENBERG ET AL., ENERGY FOR
A SUSTAINABLE WORLD 210 (1987).
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permits developing countries will be able to sell if their actual emissions
increase 1.4% per year. Assuming the price of permits rises to $100 a ton by
2025, the proceeds to developing countries from the sale of excess permits are
given in column 5.
Table 4
Year
col. 1
C0 2
col. 2
Developing
Country
Allocation
col. 3
Excess
Permits
col. 4
Value
(US$B)
col. 5
To determine whether there will be enough permits to go around, compare
the industrial country permit deficit (Table 3, column 4) to the total number of
permits. The total number of purchasable permits equals the number of
developing country excess permits (Table 4, column 4) plus the number of
unallocated permits held by the abatement fund (Table 2, column 6). As can
be seen in Table 5, until 2005 and 2010 there are more than enough permits
available to meet the needs of both industrial and developing countries. After
that time, however, there is a scarcity of permits. Thus, a mechanism for
"creating" more permits will be needed.
1995 2.0 Gt 2.0 Gt 0.0 Gt 0.0
2000 2.1 Gt 2.2 Gt 0.1 Gt 1.7
2005 2.3 Gt 2.4 Gt 0.1 Gt 3.3
2010 2.4 Gt 2.7 Gt 0.3 Gt 15.0
2015 2.6 Gt 2.9 Gt 0.3 Gt 20.0
2020 2.8 Gt 3.2 Gt 0.4 Gt 33.3
2025 3.0 Gt 3.5 Gt 0.5 Gt 50.0
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Table 5
Industrial
Country Permit
Deficit
col. 2
Developing
Country Excess
Permits
col. 3
F. Creating Permits Through Afforestation and Reforestation
The potential permit shortfall, as predicted in Table 5, could be made up
by "creating" additional permits through afforestation. It is estimated that
sixteen million hectares of new forest will sequester about 0.1 Gt of carbon per
year. 3 Thus, starting around 2007, it would be necessary to plant about eight
million hectares a year to make up the permit shortfall.5 4 Although there are
other valuable techniques for increasing carbon uptake, such as improved forest
and soil management and sustanably-harvested biomass, the difficulty in
quantifying the amount of carbon gained would make it difficult to give any
credit for the use of such techniques.55
Permits created through afforestation should reflect other values as well, in
particular, the need to maintain indigenous populations within biodiverse
forests. Therefore, monoculture tree farms might get little or no credit for
sequestered carbon, and thus should not be used to offset or compensate for
deforestation.
53. Roger A. Sedjo & Allen M. Solomon, Climate and Forests, in GREENHOUSE WARMING:
ABATEMENT AND ADAPTATION 105, 113 (Resources for the Future ed., 1989).
54. A report from the U.S. Department of Energy contemplates the possibility of afforesting
137.6 million hectares in the U.S. alone. Richard A. Bradley et al., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
LIMITING NET GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
17 (1991).
55. Todd Goldman, Go Carefully on Carbon Sinks, ECO, Dec. 9, 1991, at 3, 3.
Year
col. 1
1995 0.0 Gt 0.0 Gt 0.0 Gt 0.0 Gt
2000 0.3 Gt 0.1 Gt 0.5 Gt 0.3 Gt
2005 0.5 Gt 0.1 Gt 0.5 Gt 0.1 Gt
2010 1.1 Gt 0.3 Gt 0.7 Gt -0.1 Gt
2015 1.2 Gt 0.3 Gt 0.6 Gt -0.3 Gt
2020 1.2 Gt 0.5 Gt 0.3 Gt -0.4 Gt
2025 1.3 Gt 0.5 Gt 0.0 Gt -0.8 Gt
Unallocated
Permits
col. 4
Total
Excess
Permits
ol. 5
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G. Permit Banking
Permits can either expire at the end of the year in which they are allocated
or be "banked" for future use. Banking would help smooth out the effects of
business and weather cycles and, by ensuring that unused permits do not lose
their value, would encourage polluters to defer present-day emissions. This
would be environmentally beneficial even if the stockpiled permits are
eventually used. While it has been suggested that banking might encourage
hoarding,' 6 it might also reduce the demand for future permits, making them
more available for developing country use.
H. Controlling Small-Scale Emissions
Emissions from fossil fuels used directly by consumers-such as gasoline,
natural gas, and heating oil-could be included in the carbon emissions baseline
for determining each country's permit allocation. While it is not practical to
control such small scale emissions by requiring consumers to obtain emissions
permits, vehicle manufacturers and other manufacturers of fuel-consuming
products and equipment could be required to obtain permits to cover their
products' annual emissions. Permits could be allocated to these manufacturers
based on the estimated total emissions of their products in the past year. The
permit scheme for these manufacturers would be much the same as the energy-
based permit scheme described above: each year they would receive permits
covering a slightly smaller percentage of the previous year's emissions. Like
other permit holders, manufacturers would have the choices of making their
products more fuel efficient, purchasing more permits, or reducing their output.
CONCLUSION
This article proposes a combined strategy for responding to global warming
using marketable permits, emissions fees, and country commitments to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions and to finance the costs associated with global
warming. It recommends that a permit scheme initially allocate permits on the
basis of historical emissions but ultimately converge to a common per capita
level. This scheme provides a reasonable compromise between the industrial
countries' desire to avoid sudden or dramatic disruptions to their economies
and the legitimate concerns of the developing countries that the earth's
assimilative capacity not be monopolized or used up by industrial countries.
It creates an abatement fund from unallocated permits to cover the costs to
developing countries of reducing their future emissions and a separate damage
fund from sliding-scale emissions fees to cover external costs of GHG pollution,
in keeping with the polluter pays principle.
56. Markandya, supra note 43, at 60.
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This discussion only begins to address the many questions such a strategy
raises. A workable system for monitoring CO2 emissions accurately at national
and international levels has yet to be devised. Suitable institutions that could
be trusted to allocate permits and identify and deal with violations need to be
created. Difficulties with the actual permit trading arrangements, such as the
possibility that countries will hoard permits and use monopoly power to
eliminate competition, must be addressed as well. Most importantly, any
trading scheme's success depends on the participating countries' perception that
the system is working.
The difficulties presented by the details of implementing the proposed
strategy are beyond the scope of this article. However, if the effects of global
warming are as severe as many fear they will be, the international community
will have to establish a system of setting emissions limits and sharing the costs
of meeting those goals. This proposal is intended to provide an outline of such
a strategy. It is the author's hope that the ideas presented here will stimulate
further discussion.
